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It is known that courtroom decisions can be influenced by subtle psychological biases, 
such as asking leading questions. Informed by metaphor research on the connection 
between spatial proximity and intimacy (e.g., ‘we are close’, ‘their views are far 
apart’), this paper reports four experiments that look at the potential role of 
psychological biases arising from the spatial layout of a courtroom. In particular, we 
ask the question: Does being close or far to a defendant influence one’s reasoning 
about who is likely to win or lose a court case? Working with an American (jury-
based) legal system as an example, our experiments manipulated the physical distance 
between the jury box and the defendant’s table as shown on images of a courtroom. 
Across several manipulations, we discovered that participants judged the defendant to 
be more likely to win when the defendant’s table was located close to the jury box. 
These studies are in line with the research on “metaphor-enriched social cognition”, 
showing that the way we talk about relationships in terms of space corresponds to 
social reasoning in a spatial world. 
Keywords: social distance; spatial metaphor; spatial bias; courtroom layout 
 
To ensure reproducibility, all data and analysis scripts are made available via the 








When English speakers talk about relationships they often use language that directly 
relates to space. They often make statements such as ‘I feel very close to my 
roommate’, ‘The newlyweds are drifting apart’, and ‘He feels distant from his co-
workers’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In such statements, the source domain of SPACE 
or PHYSICAL DISTANCE is used to refer to the target domain of INTIMACY or SOCIAL 
DISTANCE. Such metaphorical statements are pervasive in discourse about social 
relationships, including friendships, work relationships, and romantic relationships 
(see Matthews & Matlock, 2010). 
 Expressions such as ‘I feel very close to my roommate’ have been discussed in 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 
2002) under the banner of the conceptual metaphor SOCIAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL 
DISTANCE, or alternatively, INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS. This metaphor is best 
characterized as a primary metaphor (Grady, 1997, 2005; Winter & Matlock, 2017), a 
basic metaphor that derives from repeated experience with statistical regularities in 
our environment, in this case the pervasive correlation between physical distance and 
social distance. For example, we generally surround ourselves with people we like or 
grow up with, such as family members. Such individuals are often both spatially and 
socially ‘close’ to us. Such associations are thought to ultimately lead to an 
entrenched mental association between the social and the physical (for discussion, see 
Winter & Matlock, 2017), which ultimately is thought to underlie linguistic 
metaphorical expressions such as ‘I feel very close to my roommate’. 
 In social psychology, researchers are increasingly recognizing the importance 
of metaphor, a movement that has been described as characterizing “metaphor-
enriched social cognition” (Landau, Meier & Keefer, 2010). Many aspects of social 
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life are talked about in terms of more concrete phenomena. For example, people are 
described as warm or cold or deep or shallow. Behavioral experiments show that 
these ways of talking about social phenomena are mirrored in non-linguistic thought. 
For example, holding a warm cup can make people perceive family members as more 
likeable (Williams & Bargh, 2008), in line with metaphorical statements such as ‘she 
has a warm personality’. People are also quicker to judge whether a manager is more 
powerful than an assistant if the word manager is displayed above the word assistant 
(Schubert, 2005), in line with such metaphorical statements as ‘she is at the top of the 
hierarchy’. 
 These findings from social psychology are important for many reasons. Within 
the domain of metaphor research itself, the findings support the idea that metaphor is 
more than a linguistic flourish or rhetorical device; rather, they empirically 
demonstrate that metaphor underlies much of our everyday thought, a core tenet of 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Despite early skepticism about the psychological 
reality of conceptual metaphor (see Murphy, 1996, 1997), there is now substantial 
evidence showing that metaphor figures into our thinking about many dimensions of 
life, including social life (see Landau et al., 2010). In line with this burgeoning 
research movement, our work shows how metaphorical thinking patterns may be 
relevant in the social context of courtrooms and legal decisions. 
 Courtrooms are physical spaces where decision-making demands objective 
reasoning about important matters. Judges are trained to make impartial decisions. 
Attorneys are required to adhere to strict codes of conduct. Jurors are instructed to be 
objective. However, bias is known to creep into courtroom reasoning. Courtroom 
decisions can be biased by race (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001), gender (Cohen & 
Peterson, 1981) and emotions (Horowitz, Kerr, Park, & Grockel, 2006). Language is 
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also known to create bias. For example, Loftus and Palmer (1974) showed 
participants videos of car crashes and subsequently asked ‘About how fast were the 
cars going when they smashed into each other?’  or ‘bumped into each other?’. 
Participants gave higher speed ratings after the first question even though they saw 
exactly the same videos. Similarly, the grammar of the question asked (‘What was 
happening?’ versus ‘What happened?’) can lead to differences in how people report 
on previously seen car accidents (Matlock, Sparks, Matthews, Hunter & Huette, 2012; 
see also Sherrill, Eerland, Zwaan & Magliano, 2015, for comparable results showing 
influences of grammatical aspect on reasoning about murder). 
The current research looks at the layout of a typical courtroom and whether 
spatial distance can influence social reasoning in legal contexts. The layout of the 
courtroom is closely tied to what a culture thinks of its legal system (Mulcahy, 2010). 
In a historical analysis of courtrooms, Mulcahy (2010) discusses how the courtroom is 
a social space connected to perceptions of civic pride, class, equality and justice. She 
notes that the “social significance of court architecture has long been neglected by 
academics” (Mulcahy, 2010: 3). Our study looks specifically at the role of DISTANCE 
in courtroom settings. More generally we are interested in the above-mentioned 
metaphor SOCIAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE / INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS. We 
examine the American courtroom, which, in some cases, involves a jury that 
participates in the process of deciding whether a defendant is guilty or innocent. We 
are especially interested in how physical distance between the jury box and the 
defendant’s table might influence reasoning in court cases. 
Physical distance and social distance are known to be linked (Bishop, 2008; 
Christakis & Fowler, 2009; Hall, 1966). In a study by McCall, Bunyan, Bailenson, 
Blascovich and Beall (2009), groups of people attended a lecture inside a virtual 
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learning environment. Participants positioned immediately in front of the lecturer 
reported liking the lecturer more and feeling more persuaded by the lecturer’s 
arguments than people positioned at the back of the virtual classroom. In Williams 
and Bargh (2008), participants were asked to draw two dots close to each other or far 
from each other on a coordinate system on a sheet of paper. People in the close dot 
condition reported feeling more attached to family members than did people in the far 
dot condition (Williams & Bargh, 2008; see, however, Pashler, Coburn & Harris, 
2012). In Matthews and Matlock (2011), participants drew lines on a map to represent 
delivery routes through a park. They drew their lines closer to bystanders (stick 
figures on the map) when they believed the bystanders were friends, not strangers. In 
Winter and Matlock (2013), participants judged people displayed as being spatially 
close to each other as more similar than people displayed as being spatially distant. 
More generally, social distance is known to influence everyday thought, including 
social decisions (Akerlof, 1997; Kim, Schnall, Do-Joon, & White, 2013). All these 
findings support the idea that people readily anchor their understanding of social 
distance in terms of spatial distance (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau et al., 2010). 
In light of these and other findings, and in light of the prediction made by 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory that metaphors affect thinking, spatial distance may 
very well play a role in how jurors and others in the courtroom reason and make 
decisions. This paper reports a series of experiments that lend support to this idea. 
Because we do not examine real courtrooms, our studies are to be taken as a proof-of-
concept demonstration. We are interested in whether biases associated with social 
distance will emerge in reasoning about legal decisions that happen in a courtroom. In 
particular, because the jury box is often closer to the prosecutor’s table than the 
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defendant’s table in American courtrooms (Shepard, 2005), will we see bias against 
the defendant? 
 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
Our experiments used hypothetical courtroom scenarios that were visually displayed 
on a computer screen. We ran each experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (see 
Bohannon, 2011) with adult participants from across the United States. We were 
especially interested in how participants would reason about whether the defendant or 
prosecutor would win a case, and how this would vary depending on distance between 
the jury box and the defendant’s table. Some of our experiments used a side view of 
the courtroom (3D depiction of courtroom), and others, an areal map-based view (2D 
depiction). The experiments vary on the amount of detail they provide on the actual 
court case, moving from absolutely no context on the case (Experiments 1 to 2) to 
short vignettes that describe a hypothetical hit-and-run accident and include some 
biasing language (Experiments 3 and 4). We ran separate participants across all 
experiments, i.e., no participants participated in any experiment twice
1
. 
 In Experiment 1, 105 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. To ensure that they knew some basics about court cases, including which 
parties are typically involved in an American trial, they were first required to read 
generic information about prosecutors and defendants as well as information about 
juror’s duties. Right after this, participants read the following instructions: 
                                                             
1
 We collected no demographic information about participants because it was beyond 
the scope of this study. Moreover, Conceptual Metaphor Theory makes no predictions 
about how certain demographic groups will or should respond in this particular case, 
especially because all participants are expected to have experienced the same 
underlying correlation of social and physical distance. 
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“Imagine you are one of the jury members, and you analyze the layout of the 
courtroom. Without knowing details about the case, click on the table that you 
feel is most likely to win.” 
Immediately after clicking a start button on the screen, participants were presented 
with a picture of a courtroom on the screen, shown from the perspective of where 
jurors would be seated in an actual courtroom. The courtroom scene included two 
tables, one marked ‘Prosecutor’, and another, ‘Defendant’, as shown in Figure 1. The 
courtroom scene remained on the screen until participants clicked on one of the two 
tables. For participants in the close condition, the defendant’s table was located near 
the jury box. For participants in the far condition, it was far from the jury box.  
 
 
Figure 1: Courtroom pictures that were used in Experiment 1. (For Experiments 2-4, 
the font size for the labels ‘Defendant’ and ‘Prosecutor’ was the same size) 
 
Participants selected the winner by clicking on one of the two tables, and then 
indicated how confident they were about their selection on a scale from 1 (not 
confident) to 9 (very confident). They also indicated whether they had ever served on 
a jury. Of the 105 participants, 14 reported having served on a jury (~13%). 
We also manipulated the side of the room the defendant’s table was seen on to 
make sure any effects that arose were not be driven by a left-right distinction, i.e., the 
 9 
defendant table was either shown on the left or the right side in the image. The right 
side is often viewed more positively than left, at least for right-handers (see 
Casasanto, 2009; Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011). The design of this experiment was a 
2 X 2, with the factors of Distance (close versus far distance between Defendant and 
Prosecutor) and Table Orientation (left versus right). 
 
2.2. Analysis 
All analyses were conducted with R (R Core Team, 2014). In line with standards for 
reproducible research in data science, the full data and analyses are available on the 




 Because the dependent measure is a binary choice (defendant versus 
prosecutor), we used logistic regression throughout our analyses. Logistic regression 
is a standard statistical methodology that enabled us to model the forced choice of 
defendant versus prosecutor as a function of several different factors. Our logistic 
regression model included the predictors Distance (close versus far), Jury Experience 
(served on jury versus did not serve on jury), Room Orientation (jury box left versus 
right side of room) and Confidence (1 to 9 scale). We also included the interaction 
term for Orientation * Distance to see whether the affective associations with the left 
or right view of the room modulate any effects caused by distance. To facilitate the 
interpretation of main and interaction effects, all our categorical predictors were 
deviation coded (-0.5 versus 0.5), and all our continuous predictors, centered 
(Schielzeth, 2010). It should be noted that the results reported below are also obtained 
if we use Chi-Square tests instead of logistic regression, thus, ignoring all control 
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variables (such as Confidence). The only mismatch between the two analyses was 




First, we observed a reliable effect of Distance (log odds: 1.47, SE = 0.44, Wald’s z = 
3.34, p < 0.001), represented in Figure 2. When the defendant’s table was located 
close to the jury box, 31 participants (67%) selected the defendant and 15 selected the 
prosecutor (33%). When the defendant’s table was far from the jury box, only 18 
picked the defendant (31%) and 41 (69%) picked the prosecutor. Table 1 shows the 
exact counts of defendant and prosecutor responses as a function of distance for all 
experiments reported in this paper. 
We did not observe a main effect of Confidence (0.06, SE = 0.11, z = 0.53, p = 
0.60). Nor did we see an effect of Jury Experience (-0.23, SE = 0.63, z = 0.23, p = 
0.71) or Room Orientation (0.56, SE = 0.48, z = 1.07 p = 0.29). Nor did we see an 
interaction between Distance and Room Orientation (0.18, SE = 0.86, z = 0.2, p = 
0.84). Thus, the Distance effect was statistically reliable regardless of whether the 
room was viewed from the left side or the right side. 
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Figure 2: Results of Experiment 1. When the defendant’s table was close to the jury, 
67% of all participants picked the defendant as the winner. When the defendant’s 
table was far from the jury, only 31% chose the defendant. 
 
    Defendant Prosecutor Chi-square 
Experiment 1 (N = 105) Near 18 41 χ2(1) = 12.68 
(3D perspective) Far 31 15 p = 0.00037 
     Experiment 1 (N = 117) Near 20 36 χ2(1) = 4.66 
(replication with equal font sizes) Far 35 26 p = 0.03 
     Experiment 2 (N = 102) Near 12 33 χ2(1) = 10.86 
(2D perspective) Far 35 22 p = 0.00099 
     
Experiment 3A (N = 122) Near 22 38 χ2(1) = 3.36 
(2D perspective with language) Far 34 28 p = 0.067 
     Experiment 3B (N = 122) Near 22 40 χ2(1) = 2.07 
(3D perspective with language) Far 30 30 p = 0.15 
     Experiment 4A (N = 201) Near 36 67 χ2(1) = 1.66 
(2D perspective with delay) Far 50 48 p = 0.19 
     Experiment 4B (N = 201) Near 37 59 χ2(1) = 4.66 































Table 1: Raw counts broken down by distance (marginal sums across all other 
factors) with corresponding Chi-square tests for all experiments reported below 
 
2.4. Discussion and replication 
The results of our experiment suggest bias whereby spatial reasoning influenced 
social reasoning about a highly stylized and decontextualized court case. Precisely, 
the distance between the jury box and the defendant and the prosecutor influenced 
decisions about who would win a court case. Our participants inferred that the 
defendant would be more likely to win the case when the defendant’s table was 
located closer to the jury box than the prosecutor’s table. These results are consistent 
with prior work on spatial distance and social distance. 
 One shortcoming of this experiment relates to font size: We used different font 
sizes for the labels ‘Defendant’ and ‘Prosecutor’ to enhance the 3D perspective of the 
visually displayed room. We cannot rule out the possibility that people preferred to 
click on the label with the larger font, given that it was more noticeable (see 
Oppenheimer, 2008, for discussion of how ease of understanding, including 
readability of fonts, can influence reasoning tasks). To address this concern, we re-ran 
Experiment 1 with constant font size with 117 new volunteers from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (14.5% reported having served on a jury). We replicated the 
Distance effect (0.87, SE = 0.38, z = 0.26, p = 0.024). In the close condition, 35 
participants (57%) picked the defendant and 26 participants (43%) picked the 
prosecutor. In the far condition, only 20 participants (36%) picked the defendant, and 
36 participants (64%) picked the defendant. The results rule out the possibility that 
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font size drove the effects of Experiment 1.
2
  Still, participants could have felt more 
drawn to the closer table in the courtroom because it was in the foreground and 
appeared larger. To address this, we used aerial view of the room in Experiment 2. 
 
4. Experiment 2 
4.1. Method 
For Experiment 2, we changed the picture of the courtroom, as shown in Figure 3. 
Instead of using a side perspective, we used a 2D aerial perspective. To test again 
whether Room Orientation (left versus right side of the screen, in line with Casasanto, 
2009; Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011) would matter for this new visual stimulus, we 
re-included the left-right manipulation, showing the jury box to the left or to the right 
of the two tables. A total of 102 participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Nine participants reported that they had previously served on a jury (~9%). 
 
Figure 3: Experiment 2 stimuli (courtroom depiction using a 2D bird-s eye view). 
                                                             
2
 In an earlier attempt to replicate the Distance effect without the size concern we 
failed to find a significant effect (see data and analysis on GitHub). In this particular 
version we made the entire tables into clickable areas by superimposing grey boxes on 
them. After running the experiment, we realized that it may not have been clear that 




There was an effect of Distance (1.45, SE = 0.44, z = 3.32, p = 0.0009), with 35 
participants (61%) as opposed to 22 participants (39%) picking the defendant when 
the defendant’s table was close to the jury, and only 12 participants (27%) as opposed 
to 33 participants (73%) picking the defendant’s table in the far condition. As with 
Experiment 1, there was no effect of Room Orientation (0.01, SE = 0.44, z = 0.03, p = 
0.98) and no Room Orientation * Distance interaction (0.93, SE = 0.89, z = 1.04, p = 
0.30). Once again there was no effect of Confidence (-0.01, SE = 0.11, z = 0.12, p = 
0.90) or Jury Experience (0.12, SE = 0.78, z = 0.15, p = 0.88). 
 
4.3. Discussion 
Experiment 2, a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 (new visual stimulus) shows 
that once again participants were more likely to believe the defendant would win 
when the defendant was located close to the jury. However, up to this point, none of 
the experiments included information about what crimes were committed. It is known 
that when participants have insufficient information to make judgments (such as no 
information about the nature of a court case), they may pay greater attention to certain 
information (such as in our case, space) than they might otherwise do (see Van den 
Bos, 2003; Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). Perhaps participants in our 
earlier studies paid special attention to the configuration of the courtroom in the 
absence of information about crime. We designed Experiments 3A and 3B with the 




5. Experiments 3A & 3B 
5.1. Method 
For Experiments 3A and 3B, we ran a total of 244 participants on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. None had volunteered for the previous experiments. A total of 35 
reported having served on a jury (~14%). Before viewing the courtroom image, 
participants read the following passage on the computer screen: 
John is in court today because he was accused of a hit-and-run accident. The 
defendant has much evidence to show that John was not responsible for the 





Next, participants saw the courtroom. We manipulated the information provided in 
the text in a 2 X 2 design. In one case, there was evidence to support the defendant, 
and in another, evidence against him (Linguistic Framing Condition, ‘for’ or 
‘against’). We also manipulated whether there was a good deal of evidence or little 
evidence (Evidence Strength, ‘much evidence’ versus ‘some evidence’). These 
manipulations were designed to assess whether the distance effects holds independent 
across these conditions, even if the linguistic context biases in the direction opposite 
of a distance effect. After reading the passage, one half (Experiment 3A, N=122) was 
presented with the bird’s eye view (2D), and the other half (Experiment 3B, N=122), 
the side view (3D perspective). 
5.2. Results 
                                                             
3
 We recognize that there is a potential ambiguity with ‘the defendant’, which could 
be taken to refer to John or to the attorney who is representing him. However, both 
would be sitting at the same table, and distance could play a role in either case. 
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Experiment 3A (2D map version) replicated the Distance effect
4
 (1.12, SE = 0.48, z = 
2.37, p = 0.02). In the close condition, 34 participants (55%) selected the defendant 
and 28 (45%) selected the prosecutor. In the far condition, only 22 participants (37%) 
selected the defendant, and 38 participants (63%) selected the prosecutor. Again, no 
effects were obtained for Confidence (0.09, SE = 0.11, z = 0.81, p = 0.42) and Jury 
Experience (-0.49, SE = 0.74, z = 0.66, p = 0.51). There was a strong Linguistic 
Framing effect (2.34, SE = 0.46, z = 5.12, p < 0.0001), but no main effect of Evidence 
Strength (‘strong’ versus ‘weak’, -0.35, SE = 0.45, z = 0.79, p = 0.43) and no 
Evidence Strength * Framing interaction (-1.68, SE = 0.93, z = 1.25, p = 0.21). 
Experiment 3B (3D version) failed to replicate the Distance effect (0.41, SE = 
0.47, z = 0.88, p = 0.38), but there was a numerical trend consistent with previous 
experiments, but only in the far condition. In the close condition, 30 participants 
(50%) picked the defendant and 30 participants (50%) picked the prosecutor. In the 
far condition, 22 participants (35%) picked the defendant and 40 participants (65%) 
picked the prosecutor. Consistent with all prior experiments, there were no effects of 
Confidence (-0.06, SE = 0.12, z = 0.499, p = 0.62) and Jury Experience (0.2, SE = 
0.61, z = 0.33, p = 0.74). There was a main effect of Linguistic Framing (-2.6, SE = 
0.48, z = 5.45, p < 0.0001) and no main effect of Evidence Strength (-0.43, SE = 0.48, 
z = 0.896, p = 0.37). In contrast to Experiment 3A, there was an Evidence Strength * 
Framing interaction (-2.23, SE = 0.96, z = 2.33, p < 0.02), with participants being less 
likely to pick the defendant (‘John’) if the text suggested that there was much 
evidence against him. 
                                                             
4
 As shown in Table 1, the Distance effect was not indicated to be statistically reliable 
in the Chi-square analysis of the marginal sums (p = 0.067). This may be because the 
variance account for by the other factors is not captured by a simple Chi-square test. 
As discussed below, the Chi-square test is significant if data is combined across 




Experiment 3A replicated the Distance effect, showing that Distance influences 
judgments about the outcome of courtroom trials in situations with a little more 
context on the court case. Experiment 3B, however, only found a numerical trend. 
The difference between Experiment 3A and 3B might have to do with processing 
spatial information on maps versus other depictions (cf. Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 
1982; Tversky, 2000, 2001), a point to which we return below. 
 So far, the experiments found an effect of Distance in information-uncertain 
situations with 3D side views of the courtroom (Experiment 1, but not 3B) and 2D 
map views (Experiment 2 and 3A). In these cases, participants had to provide a 
judgment about the outcome of the court case while viewing a picture of the room and 
clicking on the corresponding tables (the defendant table and the prosecutor table). In 
real-world court cases, juries generally do not make legal decisions while being inside 
the courtroom. Instead, they deliberate and make decisions away from the defendant 
and prosecutor. To emulate this situation a bit more closely, we ran Experiment 4A 
and 4B, in which participants made decisions after having viewed the courtroom. 
 
6. Experiments 4A & 4B 
6.1. Method 
In Experiment 4A and 4B, we tested a total of 402 participants. Participants first read 
the context passage from Experiment 3. Then, the courtroom image was displayed for 
8 seconds, followed by a separate screen with the question ‘Who do you feel will win 
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the case?’ on top of two buttons (one for the defendant, one for the prosecutor). The 
orientation of buttons was counter-balanced (defendant top, prosecutor top). 
 We ran 201 participants with the bird’s eye version of the courtroom (4A) and 
another 201 with the side version (4B). As with Experiment 4A and 4B, we included 
linguistic context with the conditions Linguistic Framing (‘for’ or ‘against’) and 
Evidence Strength (‘much’ versus ‘some’). Of the total of 402 participants, 44 had 
previously served on a jury (~11%). 
 
6.2. Results 
Experiment 4A (bird’s eye version) provided another successful replication of the 
Distance effect (0.79, SE = 0.36, z = 2.2, p = 0.03). In the close condition, 50 
participants (51%) picked the defendant and 48 (49%) picked the prosecutor. In the 
far condition, only 36 participants (35%) picked the defendant and 67 participants 
(65%) picked the prosecutor. Again, there was no effect of Jury Experience (-0.55, SE 
= 0.59, z = 0.92, p = 0.36), but this time, there was a confidence effect (0.26, SE = 
0.11, z = 2.48, p = 0.03), with participants who were more confident being more 
likely to pick the defendant. Response Button Orientation had no effect (-0.27, SE = 
0.36, z = 0.74, p = 0.46). Again, we found that linguistic context mattered. When the 
case was framed as being against John, people were less likely to pick the defendant 
response option (-2.6, SE = 0.38, z = 6.84, p < 0.0001). There was no main effect of 
Evidence Strength (-0.45, SE = 0.37, z = 1.21, p = 0.23) and no Evidence Strength * 
Framing Interaction (-1.31, SE = 0.76, z = 1.73, p = 0.08). 
 As in Experiment 3B, in Experiment 4B (3D version) there was no Distance 
effect (0.33, SE = 0.38, z = 0.88, p = 0.38), but there was a numerical trend in a 
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consistent direction: In the near condition, 51 participants (49%) picked the defendant 
and 54 participants (51%) picked the prosecutor. In the far condition, only 37 
participants picked the defendant (39%) and 59 participants (61%) picked the 
prosecutor. There were no effects of Jury Experience (-0.7, SE = 0.56, z = 1.25, p = 
0.21), Confidence (0.09, SE = 0.1, z = 0.95, p = 0.34) or Response Button Orientation 
(-0.6, SE = 0.37, z = 1.6, p = 0.11). There was a main effect of Linguistic Framing (-
2.95, SE = 0.39, z = 7.42, p < 0.0001), but there was no main effect of Evidence 
Strength (-0.62, SE = 0.39, z = 1.57, p = 0.12) and no Evidence Strength * Framing 
interaction (-1.29, SE = 0.79, z = 1.65, p = 0.09). 
 
6.3. Discussion 
Experiment 4A provided another replication of the Distance effect, this time with 
added linguistic context and a delayed response that did not arise during the 
presentation of the room. However, as in Experiment 3B, the 3D side view of the 
room did not produce a statistically reliable effect, but only a numerical trend. This 
shows that the result for the map-based view is robust, but the Distance effect appears 
to be much diminished when context and delay are added to the side view version of 
the experiment. This could relate to different processing strategies that go along with 
viewing maps or other schematic spatial representations (Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 
1982) compared to viewing actual space. 
Another possibility is that there is a confounding factor in the 3D side view 
stimuli. Note that in Figure 1, the far table also occupies a central position in the 
room. It is known that people have a preference for looking at the center of an image 
or a computer screen (e.g., Buswell, 1935; Tatler, 2007). As predicted by the mental 
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connection between space and social distance, the “defendant far” conditions should 
induce a dispreference to choose the defendant. However, co-present with this 
dispreference might be a preference to click on the central element of a scene, which 
would tend to reduce the strength of the Distance effect. Future experiments will need 
to control for position (central versus non-central) as well as for distance. 
 
7. General Discussion 
In summary, across four experiments with 970 participants using stylized courtroom 
depictions, we showed that the layout of the courtroom can bias how jurors reason 
about who should win a court case. In general, there was a consistent pattern whereby 
participants believed that the party sitting closer to the jury would win. The only 
failures to replicate this effect were Experiment 3B and 4B. That is, in two 
experiments did the 2D version show an effect, but the 3D version did not. We think 
that people might engage more deeply in spatial reasoning when viewing the 2D 
bird’s eye version of the courtroom because people are used to inferring spatial 
relations from maps and other schematic representations (Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 
1982; Tversky, 2010). Alternatively, the particular spatial images chosen for the 3D 
side view version may have a centrality confound (see discussion above), with the far 
condition also being more central, which might reduce any dispreference to click on 
the far table because of a preference to click on the more central response option 
provided in the courtroom scene. The 3D version might also appear strange to 
participants because it is relatively more realistic than the map, yet still highly 
artificial. Future research will need to show why the distance effect disappeared in 
this particular condition. 
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 How do these results relate to the metaphor SOCIAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL 
DISTANCE / INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS? The results we obtained here show that 
reasoning related to the target domain (social relations) is influenced by space, the 
source domain, in line with expressions such as ‘she is a close friend’ and ‘their views 
couldn't be further apart’. To the extent that we manipulated something that belongs 
to a concrete source domain and observed an effect in more high-level reasoning 
processes, we followed the “metaphoric transfer strategy” of experimental methods 
(Landau et al., 2010). It should be pointed out, however, that our findings in no way 
imply that people somehow “activate” a conceptual metaphor when reasoning about 
the stimuli we presented. In fact, participants could have made their decisions with 
“literal” thought. For example, participants might have made the inference that if a 
defendant was farther away, his facial expressions or eyes were less visible, 
constraining his opportunity to convey emotions and undermining his ability to 
participate in the trial (cf. Mulcahy, 2010: 10; see also Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall & 
Loomis, 2003). Increased distance means less engagement and less opportunity for 
empathy, which is known to decrease perceptions of lawfulness (Archer, Foushee, 
Davis & Aderman, 1979). However, even though the results themselves could be due 
to literal thought, our findings clearly correspond to the spatial language that we use 
to talk about social relations and in this sense indirectly support the idea of the mental 
presence of the conceptual metaphor SOCIAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE. 
 What are the limitations and challenges of this work? The absence of 
statistically reliable Distance effects in experiments 3B and 4B may appear to be 
problematic, however, an analysis combining data from Experiment 3B and 4B yields 
a statistically reliable Distance effect (simple Chi-square test: χ2(1) = 4.07, p = 0.043). 
And it should be mentioned that even in the absence of a reliable effect, the numerical 
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trends observed are still worrisome for the idea of wholly “spatially unbiased” 
courtroom decisions, with only 35% of all participants choosing the defendant in the 
far conditions of Experiments 3B and 4B, as opposed to 50% participants in the close 
condition. 
Regarding the limitations of this work, we should again emphasize that in this 
set of studies, we are merely probing thoughts about courtroom situations rather than 
actual courtroom decisions. And we do so in a way that deliberately focuses on the 
role of spatial factors at the expense of considering other variables (such as 
demographic factors, gender biases or biases resulting from race/ethnic background). 
Moreover, as conducting web-based experiments requires keeping surveys short, we 
focus on very simple cases as opposed to decisions that result from long 
contemplation based on a complex and variegated set of evidence and arguments. 
Determining the extent to which the spatial bias discussed in this paper affects actual 
courtroom decisions requires in-depth investigation in the future. New work could use 
more realistic visual stimuli (e.g., photographs, videos) and more realistic background 
information to increase ecological validity. To further increase the realism of the 
fictive courtroom, one could even use immersive virtual environments, as was done 
by Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall and Noveck (2006). 
 To conclude, the work reported here expands our knowledge of social distance 
and its connection to spatial distance. The findings reveal new insights about how 
biases relate to spatial position alone may affect reasoning about guilt and innocence. 
Architects and judicial experts recognize the need to create courtrooms that maintain 
identities, including the segregation of judge, litigants, jurors (see Mulcahy, 2010). 
This paper shows that we should also recognize the potential presence of spatial bias. 
In the current American courtroom—where the defendant is most often farther from 
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the jury than the prosecutor is—the defendant may have an implicit disadvantage 
from the very start. The final verdict in any legal situation of course depends on a 
long chain of reasoning that is influenced by a whole swath of factors, most of which 
are outside the scope of the present investigation. The current results, however, do 
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